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сна структура продуктивних сил і економічних відносин, зміни в
яких є рушійною силою трансформаційних процесів в економіч-
ній системі суспільства. В доіндустріальному суспільстві факто-
ріальна структура виробництва представлена так: земля, праця,
капітал; в індустріальному суспільстві — земля, праця, капітал,
підприємництво; в постіндустріальному суспільстві — земля,
праця, капітал, підприємництво та інформація. Отже, формуван-
ня інформаційної економіки — це результат об’єктивної необхід-
ності переходу до нової постіндустріальної організації соціально-
економічної системи, яка ґрунтується на використанні потенціалу
розвитку інформаційного сектору.
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The financial crisis has created an opportunity for the IMF to
reinvigorate itself and possibly play a constructive role in resolving,
or at the least mitigating, the effects of the global downturn. It has
been operating on two fronts: (1) through immediate crisis management,
primarily balance of payments support to emerging-market and less-
developed countries, and (2) contributing to long-term systemic
reform of the international financial system. In response to the current
financial crisis, the IMF has activated its Emergency Financing
Mechanism to speed the normal process for loans tocrisis-afflicted
countries.
The G-20 leaders also called for common principles for reforming
financial markets. These principles include: strengthening the
transparency and accountability of firms and financial products,
extending regulation to all financial market institutions, promoting the
integrity of financial markets (such as bolstering consumer protection)
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and consistent regulations across national borders, and reforming
international financial institutions to better monitor the health of the
financial system. The G-20 London Summit reiterated the need for
financial supervision, regulation, and transparency of financial products.
The role of the G-20 in dealing with the global financial crisis
began on November 15, 2008, with the G-20 Summit on Financial
Markets and the World Economy that was held in Washington, DC.
This was billed as the first in a series of meetings to deal with the
financial crisis, discuss efforts to strengthen economic growth, and to
lay the foundation to prevent future crises from occurring. This
summit included emerging market economies rather than the usual G-
7 or G-8 nations that periodically meet to discuss economic issues.
The global financial crisis as it has played out in countries across
the globe has been manifest in four overlapping phases.
Phase I — Build-up
The first phase of the financial crisis is identified with a loss of
confidence in credit markets that was associated with a downturn in
the U.S. housing market caused primarily by rising defaults in
subprime mortgages. In this stage, EU governments generally
responded on a case-by-case basis, without a role for the broader
Community. A sharp downturn in mortgage markets generally would
be expected to have a negative impact on parts of the economy, but
the current financial crisis quickly evolved into a more general
liquidity crisis that spread well beyond the sub-prime mortgage
market. The financial crisis that began in the United States as a result
of a downturn in residential property values quickly spread to
European banks through effects felt in the market for asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP).As the ABCP market collapsed, banks
holding such securities were forced to step in with additional funding,
which squeezed liquidity in the global financial market through the
interbank market. Over time, banks and other financial firms found
that it was impossible to price the value of assets that were being used
to back commercial paper. During this phase, the British government
nationalized housing lender Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley, a
mortgage lender. Belgium, France, and Luxembourg governments and
shareholders provided capital to Dexia, the world’s largest lender to
municipalities, and Belgian, Dutch, and Luxembourg governments
injected $ 16,4 billion into banking and insurance company Fortis to
head off the first major bank crisis in the Euro area.
Phase II — Liquidity Issues
In the second phase, policy shifted from an ad hoc focus on the
fate of individual firms to concerns over troubled markets as central
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banks intervened to lower interest rates, to provide liquidity, and to
provide foreign currency. In the United States, as generally is the case
in most countries, the Federal Reserve, or the central bank, holds a
monopoly over the conduct of monetary policy. Normally, it is not the
role of the central bank to be the main provider of liquidity, but that
role falls to the central banks as lenders of last resort during periods of
financial crisis. In this phase, Iceland was especially hard hit by the
financial crisis, with major Icelandic banks completely shutting down
for a period of time.
Following the IMF decision, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden agreed to provide an additional $2.5 billion. During this
phase, the UK’s Financial Services Authority arranged for the sale of
a large part of Bradford & Bingley to the Spanish bank Grupo
Santander, while Fortis, a banking and insurance company received a
capital injection from the Belgian, Dutch, and Luxembourg
governments. The key feature of the plan, as promoted by British
Prime Minister Gordon Brown, has the central government acquiring
preferred shares in distressed banks for a specified amount of time,
rather than acquiring the non-performing loans of the banks.
The European Council stressed the need to strengthen the
supervision of the European financial sector. As a result, the EU
statement urged the EU members to develop a «coordinated
supervision system at the European level.» The European Central
Bank (ECB), which sets interest rates for the 16 members of the
Eurozone, cut its interest rates by half a percentage point to 3,25 %.
Euro area countries urged all European governments to help recapitalize
banks, to have governments buy shares in banks, if needed, to guarantee
the debt of banks, and to improve bank regulations.
Phase III — Solvency and Deleveraging
In the third phase, the lack of confidence in credit markets and a
lack of liquidity also sparked concerns over the adequacy of capital
provisions of financial institutions and concerns over the solvency of
banks and other financial firms. During this phase, financial firms
attempted to deleverage by reducing the amount of troubled assets
they held on their balance sheets. At the same time, the stocks of most
financial firms in the United States and in Europe dropped markedly,
and the value of their assets deteriorated, which weakened the
financial position of an even larger number of firms. In this phase,
intervention by central banks continued, but national governments
also began to intervene, typically through their respective Treasury
departments, to take control of insolvent banks or otherwise to
provide financial assistance.
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Phase IV — Fiscal Intervention
In the fourth phase, as the problems in credit markets persisted, the
financial crisis spread to those activities in the real economy that are
highly reliant on credit markets, and it reinforced concerns over the
adequacy of capital provisions. Furthermore, the slowdown in
economic growth weakened the capital position of financial
institutions so that the financial crisis and the economic downturn
have become negatively reinforcing. Governments have responded in
this phase of the crisis by adopting macroeconomic stimulus measures
to blunt the effects of the economic recession.
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ТЕОРІЯ ЦИКЛІВ У РОЗВИТКУ
ЕКОНОМІЧНИХ СИСТЕМ
Світова економіка на початок ХХІ ст. зазнала суттєвих змін.
Такі процеси, як глобалізація, лібералізація умов конкуренції в
більшості галузей, активне впровадження інформаційних техно-
логій в бізнес-процеси, визначили наперед суттєві зміни в сере-
довищі найбільших транснаціональних компаній і лідери зміни-
лися майже в усіх галузях, наприклад, в телекомунікаціях, фар-
мацевтичній галузі, роздрібній торгівлі, банківському секторі.
Причина — неспроможність адекватно реагувати на зміни. Однак
найбільш важлива причина — неефективне прогнозування мож-
ливих варіантів розвитку подій.
Дослідження характеру тимчасових і випадкових змін циклів
дозволяє зробити висновок, що будь-яка матеріальна система іс-
нує і розвивається за своїм власним часом, що залежить від хара-
ктеру циклічних змін в її структурі й зовнішньому середовищі,
